

DIVIDED WE FALL: OIL EXPLOITATION, CONSERVATION AND INDIGENOUS ORGANIZING IN THE AMAZON BASIN

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Abstract

This article explores the failures of the current development paradigm through the case study of the Madre de Dios region of the Peruvian Amazon. I examine the complex relationships between the indigenous communities, the Federación Nativa de Madre de Dios y Afluentes (FENAMAD) that represents them, and the Peruvian Government in the southeastern region of the Amazon, to argue that State's conservationist discourse limits the indigenous organization's struggle against oil extraction, preventing it from effectively representing the needs of the communities it claims to represent. Based on analysis of personal interviews with community members, published statements from FENAMAD, and legal complaints against Hunt Oil, this paper suggests that the divisions between these stakeholders are directly impeding progress towards defining and acting upon shared regional goals. I compare the desirable futures as defined by the Native Community Shintuya, FENAMAD, and the State to conclude that contrary to the federation's stance, the community sees oil as a potential opportunity for community growth. Through examination of the current strategies of indigenous umbrella organizations and other actors in the face of natural resource extraction, my case study reveals the challenges confronting indigenous communities in their struggles to define their own development and suggests strategies for moving forward toward desirable futures.

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Introduction

In 2009, widespread protests gripped the country of Peru, with thousands of indigenous, farmers, miners, campesinos and others flooding regional capitals demanding the repeal of Alan García's controversial executive orders, essentially a set of decrees allowing Amazonian territory to be sold to private companies.¹ In the southeastern region of Madre de Dios, the indigenous Federación Nativa del Río Madre de Dios y Afluentes (FENAMAD) organized extensive demonstrations to fight a now newly legitimized oil concession to Texas-based Hunt Oil superimposing on the Amarakaeri Communal Reserve (Annex 1). Protests received international media coverage and support from local NGOs and conservationists. In September of 2009, FENAMAD filed an official lawsuit against the oil company. International news and human rights organizations were quick to paint a story of a greedy, neoliberal government overstepping its constitutional bounds, partnering with a private, international oil company in the name of almighty economic growth, blatantly ignoring the cries of the native indigenous populations. Furthermore, the indigenous communities seemed set on fighting back. "We have to attack on every level using the courts", expressed FENAMAD secretary Jaime Corisepa, "but we are ready to defend our territory physically".² The reality, however, is nowhere near this black and white. The same month FENAMAD filed its lawsuit Shintuya, the largest of the 31 communities

¹Alan García issued 101 executive decrees in 2008 under the justification of insuring compliance with the newly established Peru-U.S. free trade agreement. These included Decrees 994, 020-2008-AG, and a new Forestry Law, which deemed idle and unproductive lands as well as deforested areas viable for private sale. These decrees spurred huge protests all over Peru, with the most notable occurring in the northern city of Bagua, where both police and indigenous protesters were injured and killed in violent clashes. For more information on the violent protests, see <http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/jun2009/2009-06-06-01.asp>; For a more in depth summary of the executive decrees, see <http://www.americasquarterly.org/peruvian-protests-explained>.

²Weinberg, Bill. "Peru Hunt Oil Contract to Reignite Amazon Uprising?" *NACLA Report on the Americas* (2009): 7.

that FENMAD represents, came to a critical junction. The community assembly called for a vote to decide yes or no to working with the oil company. The result: a signed deal of \$30,000 in exchange for the rights to work in the community's territory.

In many corners of academia, development scholars are recognizing the failure of the current development paradigm. Grounded in neoliberal economic theory, development has championed foreign direct investment, sound macroeconomic policy, and a largely top-down development strategy. While alternative models such as dependency theory, the capabilities approach, the center-periphery model, and others have emerged to challenge the hegemonic neoliberal model, they still operate in a system of Western/Northern dominance. In this way, development has manifested itself within this system of unequal power structures and is often contributing, not combating, the disempowerment of local communities. This current paradigm has allowed extractive industries to exploit the land and livelihood of indigenous peoples across the world, and while some social benefits have been realized in recent years, development has not changed its problematic, paternalistic nature.³ The case study of the Native Community Shintuya examined in this paper is illustrative of the consequences of this old development paradigm.

Where other development critiques call for a tweak to current development practices, or development alternatives, post development recognizes these failures and calls for alternatives to

³ This discussion is supported by a large amount of academic work, and while an understanding of the current development paradigm is necessary for this article, it is not my main focus. In seeking more information on development paradigms and their affects both world wide and in Latin America, consult the following sources as a starting point:

Peet, Richard, and Elaine Hartwick. *Theories of Development, Second Edition: Contentions, Arguments, Alternatives* (Guilford Press, 2009).

Jan Knippers Black. *Latin America, Its Problems and Its Promise: A Multidisciplinary Introduction* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984).

development.⁴ But what is meant by “alternatives” to development? Are we honestly seeking the halt in the search for development in its most pure notion, without the political and ideological connotations it has picked up throughout history? Post developmentalist Sally Matthews acknowledges that surely development in its definition of “desirable change” is still necessary, while the goal is seeking alternative ways not only to achieve but also to define this notion.⁵ This term “desirable change” is still fairly vague, and leaves us asking questions such as, how is desirable change defined? By whom? This definition becomes especially complex when involving Indigenous Peoples, largely due to the various agendas of the multiple stakeholders involved in indigenous movements.

Furthermore, in a growing literature on oil conflicts and indigenous movements, “regional cohesion and unified voice” (Vásquez, 2014) and “collective action” (Haller et al., 2007) are emphasized as critical for mobilization, resistance, and conflict resolution. In order to have a productive, effective discussion on the development of the future of Madre de Dios, stakeholders’ concept of desirable change and the relationships between them must be understood. This article discusses the challenges of cohesion and unity within the particular case of the Madre de Dios region of the Peruvian Amazon and what “desirable change” means to the various stakeholders involved. Through this, it seeks to establish the necessary contextual knowledge base to make suggestions on how this specific region can move forward towards its goals for the future, as well as contribute to the larger post development discussion on alternatives to development, specifically within the context of natural resource extraction. While conservationist discourse has gained the indigenous umbrella organization FENAMAD moderate political success in the form of the Amarakaeri Communal Reserve, it does not take into account

⁴ Matthews, Sally. “Post-development theory and the question of alternatives: a view from Africa” *Third World Quarterly* 25, no. 2, (Nov. 2009). 373.

⁵ Matthews, “Post-development theory and the question of alternatives...” (376).

the economic, historical and social needs of the native community Shintuya that have led to current regional divisions. These divisions are due largely to limitations that existing State-sponsored language imposes on FENAMAD. If Shintuya, or any other community for that matter, determines that its desirable future consists of working with an extractive industry, then the most *efficient and effective* allocation of the resources of conservation-minded organizations (i.e. FENAMAD, international NGOs) is to work with the community to get the absolute best deal possible not just environmentally, but also socially, culturally, and economically. This shifts the conversation away from the current confrontational, oil versus conservation argument and towards fostering community and regional capacity to effectively deal with extractive industries.

This article is broken down into six sections. In section two I discuss my methodology, including the relevance of my case study and my interviewing techniques. Section three addresses the historical context of the region and the relevant stakeholders. Section four contains the main analysis of my primary sources, showing how regional divisions are impeding productive dialogue. Section five discusses potential recommendations for the future of indigenous development, both broadly and specifically in the Madre de Dios region, and the last section concludes the article.

Methodology

Madre de Dios was chosen as a case study of the failures of the current development paradigm. The overall research question this article will address is, how have development failures manifested themselves in the case study of Madre de Dios, and what steps can be taken to correct these failures and effectively move forward? I was largely able to address this question in Madre de Dios due to the recent concession granted to Hut Oil in 2006, its overlap with the indigenous territory of the Amarakaeri Communal Reserve, and the presence of the

Federación Nativa de Madre de Dios y Afluentes (FENAMAD), a federation representing the native communities of the region. Shintuya is of particular interest, as it is one of two communities (the other being Puerto Luz) whose territory is affected by the exploratory activity of seismic lines (Annex 1), and its decision in 2009 to work with Hunt Oil. I decided to address post-developmentalism and regional cohesion in this region specifically because it is illustrative of the urgent need to adjust our current development practices in order to work more effectively with communities facing international-level resource extraction. With Hunt Oil's exploratory period ending in 2016, and findings showing large potential for extraction, the region and its stakeholders are standing at a critical point where decisions will need to be made and acted upon in the very near future. This study's relevance, however, is not limited to the region of Madre de Dios in Peru. As of 2010, 70% of the existing Peruvian Amazon territory was blocked off for concessions to extractive industry companies, and similar struggles are being seen in other Amazonian countries such as Ecuador and Brazil.⁶ Therefore, this article not only sheds light on the reality and possible solutions in Madre de Dios, but also the Amazon Basin as a whole.

Setting out on my study, I asked the following research question and sub questions:

- Why are there divisions between the various stakeholders in Madre de Dios surrounding the entrance of Hunt Oil into the region?
 - o How do the Peruvian government, FENAMAD, and the Native Community Shintuya view their desirable futures?
 - o What strategies does each stakeholder employ in order to achieve these futures?

In answering these questions, I analyze secondary literature on the Hunt Oil conflict, participatory conservation, post-development theory, and oil conflicts in other parts of South

⁶ Vásquez, Patricia. *Oil Sparks in the Amazon: local conflicts, indigenous populations, and natural resources* (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 2014). 14

America. I also examine primary sources, such as personal interviews with Shintuyanos, participant observations from my time in Shintuya, and published FENAMAD documents, including interviews, websites, and the legal complaint filed against Hunt Oil. In addition to participant observation, I utilized a semi-structured interview format, designed to be broad and flexible, allowing interviewees to direct the conversation in the direction they desired. My base questions included, ¿cuándo te imagines tus hijos como adultos, como ves sus vidas ideales?, ¿Qué estás haciendo ahora para realizar este futuro como una realidad?, ¿Que cosas pueden causar que no se logran el futuro ideal?, ¿Qué podría ayudar en la realización de este futuro?, y ¿como reducir a los riesgos en pregunta 3? I corresponded with 12 main informants; 8 men and 4 women, between the ages of 27 and 47, with occupations that varied between agriculture, logging, tourism, and working with Hunt Oil. The information cited from interviews all resulted from conversations produced from my base questions, and represent topics that community members brought forth on their own.

Historical Context

The native community Shintuya is one of the largest communities in the Madre de Dios region, located at the end of the Cusco-Shintuya road, on the Alto Madre de Dios river (Annex 2). It is made up of approximately 45 families (250-300 individuals) of primarily Harakmbut ethnicity, and a minority of Wachipaeri.⁷ While the Harakmbut people have their ancestral roots throughout the Madre de Dios region, the community of Shintuya was formed only in 1957, when a yellow fever outbreak affected the surrounding populations, causing them to seek help from the Dominican mission located at the site of Shintuya. Main economic activities consist of agriculture and logging, supplemented with some tourism and work with Hunt Oil. With its first

⁷ Haselip, James; Romera, Beatriz M. "Peru's Amazonian oil and gas industry: risks, interests and the politics of grievance surrounding the development of block 76, Madre de Dios", *International Development Planning Review* 33, no. 1 (February, 2011). 13.

heavy contact with the outside world occurring in the late 1950s, the community has had far less experience with cash economies and modern development practices than other actors involved in the oil concession, such as Hunt Oil and the national government.

FENAMAD was established in 1982, with the expressed objectives of organizational strengthening, territory recovery and consolidation, development with identity, intercultural bilingual education, and self-determination.⁸ The organization is made up of representatives from 31 native communities in the Madre de Dios region, and also claims representation of uncontacted groups in the area. One of FENAMAD's largest political accomplishments to date was the establishment of the Amarakaeri Communal Reserve (ACR) in 2002, seeking the recognition of the ancestral territories of the eight surrounding Harakmbut communities through the simultaneous conservation of a biodiversity hotspot (Annex 1).⁹ The communal reserve status falls under category VI of the IUCN, protected area with sustainable use of natural resources, with the priority of flora and fauna conservation for the benefit of surrounding communities.¹⁰ The Master Plan of the reserve states its primary objective as the "protection of the headwaters of the Madre de Dios and Colorado rivers, ensuring the stability of the land and forests and maintaining the quality and quantity of water, ecological equilibrium, and an adequate environment for the development of the native Harakmbut communities".¹¹

⁸ <http://fenamad.org.pe/historia.php>. Since collection of this data in October 2014, the website in question has been taken offline. The author contacted the organization via Facebook for an explanation, and was told that the website is currently undergoing reconstruction, and will be back online as soon as possible.

⁹ Alvarez, Alex; Alca, Jamil; Galvin, Marc; García, Alfredo. "The Difficult Invention of Participation in the Amarakaeri Communal Reserve, Peru" *People, Protected Areas and Global Change : Participatory Conservation in Latin America, Africa, Asia and Europe* (2008). 117.

¹⁰ SINANPE. *Informe nacional del Sistema Nacional de Áreas Protegidas por el Estado Peruano*. Lima, 2007. <http://www.pdrs.org.pe/node/300>.

¹¹ INRENA. *Reserva Comunal Amarakaeri Plan Maestro 2008-2012*. Lima, 2008. <http://www.sernanp.gob.pe/sernanp/bplanesmaestros.jsp?NroPag=6>.

The Master Plan, most recently intended for the five year implementation from 2008-2012, was designed to facilitate the effective management of the ACR and its main objectives. The management is made up of the Instituto Nacional de Recursos Naturales (INRENA), FENAMAD, and the Executor of the

Despite the initial sense of triumph in the name of indigenous land rights, however, the ACR quickly became the catalyst for the first hints of division between FENAMAD and its constituent native communities. The reserve prohibited logging and mining in the area, an activity that many locals had relied on for income, while only introducing very limited new economic opportunities (i.e. park guards, local tourism). In the end, the reserve implemented more limitations than benefits for the local communities, and the idea of participatory conservation has largely remained elusive.¹² Further, the government granting of Hunt Oil's concession to conduct business in the ACR in 2006 caused local communities to distance themselves from the ACR even more, as they saw outside actors exploiting the natural resources of their land while they themselves were forbidden to do so.¹³

Differing Realities

In looking at the various relationships between stakeholders in Madre de Dios, three main divisions become apparent: 1) divisions between the indigenous umbrella organization FENAMAD and the national government, 2) divisions between individual communities and FENAMAD, and 3) divisions within the individual communities themselves. As mentioned earlier, regional cohesion and unity are essential components to mobilization and conflict resolution, and these divisions present serious threats to achieving these goals. These divisions

Management Contract (EMC), which is made up of a committee of members of the eight communities within the ACR. The Reserve also received an initial \$1 million for its management from the UNDP under the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biological Diversity in the Amaraeri Communal Reserve project. The Plan includes proposed programs under the categories of resource conservation, public use, and management support, including community participation in the form of park guards, local tourism, environmental education, and participatory management. For more information on the Master Plan and the Reserve's management system, see Alvarez, Alex. *Invention...* (127-131)

¹² Alvarez, et al. "The Difficult Invention of Participation..." (114).

¹³ Alvarez, Alex. "Conservación participativa en la Reserva Comunal Amaraeri, Perú" *Latin American Journal of Conservation* 1, no. 1 (April, 2010). 33.

are the evidence that the current development paradigm has failed in the region, and understanding and addressing them is critical in determining how to move forward.

The Peruvian government is highly dependent on natural resource extraction for its economic development, and a lot of effort has gone into implementing pro-extraction legislation that technically complies with already established environmental regulations and international conventions.¹⁴ In the case of Hunt Oil in Madre de Dios, the priorities of the State are made quite clear, as it has consistently adjusted legislation as necessary to accommodate hydrocarbon activities. For example, in 2007, one year *after* the concession to Hunt Oil was granted, the National Service of Protected Natural Areas by the State (SERNANP) altered the phrasing of the Master Plan of the ACR to allow the possibility of oil exploration and extraction within the reserve. Instead of the original statement of, “la actividad de hidrocarburos solo podría desarrollarse bajo el estricto cumplimiento de la normatividad y los estándares ambientales aplicables, con la aprobación de la población local y de manera transparente”, the new version reads, “Durante el proceso de elaboración del plan maestro de la reserva communal Amarakaeri se determinó que la actividad hidrocarburífera en la actualidad no es una amenaza para el area natural protegida por no desarrollarse en la actualidad...”.¹⁵ This insures a legal base for the continuation of Hunt Oil’s oil exploration and even attempts to frame it as an adequate strategy for the participatory conservation of the ACR.

This change to the Master Plan is one of the main reasons FENAMAD feels cheated by the State, and has changed its policy towards Hunt Oil from one of adequate compensation and

¹⁴ Haller, Tobias, et al. *Fossil Fuels, Oil Companies, and Indigenous Peoples: strategies of multinational oil companies, states, and ethnic minorities: impact on environment, livelihoods and cultural change* (Zurich: Lit Verlag, 2007). 574

¹⁵ INRENA. *Plan Maestro...* (106,107)

consultation to one of eviction.¹⁶ The federation has denounced the Master Plan and claims that “participatory conservation is being manipulated to legitimize the execution of interests of more powerful social groups that are not necessarily for the conservation of nature, but contrary to it”.¹⁷ This base argument highlights the limitations that FENAMAD has when fighting against Hunt Oil and the national government.

The Master Plan by virtue is a conservationist document, with its primary purpose being the protection of regional headwaters. This limits FENAMAD’s argument to defending conservation and stifles conversation focused on the actual needs and realities of the region’s native communities. This is apparent in FENAMAD’s official legal complaint against Hunt Oil, where it frames its argument on the fact that hydrocarbon activities “put in grave danger” the communal reserve’s headwaters, ecological equilibrium, and biodiversity, directly affecting the surrounding communities’ quality of life.¹⁸ This phrasing is taken directly from the official management plan and centers itself on a conservation focus, placing the well-being of the community as a clear second priority. In this way the State succeeds in dichotomizing FENAMAD’s rhetoric to oil vs. conservation, distancing the federation from native communities.

While the State’s imposition of legal and political language has largely shaped FENAMAD’s response to Hunt Oil, immediate, on the ground needs have shaped that of the

¹⁶ Haselip & Romera. “Peru’s Amazonian oil and gas industry...” (20).

¹⁷ FENAMAD, “El lote 76, Hunt Oil y la Reserva Comunal Amarakaeri: una historia de corrupción y violación sistemática de derechos indígenas” *SERVINDI* (November 1, 2009). Accessed September 25, 2014. <http://servindi.org/actualidad/18359>.

¹⁸ FENAMAD v. Hunt Oil Exploration and Production Company of Peru (2009) *Corte Superior de Justicia de Madre de Dios*. Acción de amparo. Section I, p.2. http://www.fenamad.org/pdfs/accion_de_amparo_fenamad.pdf (website under construction). In this context, quality of life is framed in terms of basic health needs such as adequate water and sanitation.

native community Shintuya. In a personal interview, a community member expressed a widely shared sentiment towards Hunt Oil:

“I was the first to say that the oil company should enter, because there was not and is not support from anyone else”.¹⁹

Many others also expressed their concerns over lack of work and basic services.²⁰ In this way, the community sees oil as an opportunity to gain some of their current needs that are not being met. This is not to say that Shintuyanos do not question the sustainability or viability of working with Hunt Oil. In fact, many community members are adamant that it is not steady work and that it will contaminate their territory.²¹ Even within this portion of the community who originally opposed the oil company, however, the general sentiment is that its presence is already an accepted occurrence, and Shintuya should take advantage of it to the fullest extent possible.²² This further undermines the FENAMAD’s eviction strategy and their legitimacy within the community. The oil company is showing immediate benefits while FENAMAD only provides political and ideological support. In their work in Shintuya, Haselip and Romera quote the community nurse explaining, “ you cannot see their work. They [FENAMAD] call them and communicate with them, but there are no concrete projects”.²³ In a community assembly that I attended in the fall of 2013, the community reacted fairly indifferently to a letter from FENAMAD soliciting the community’s support in “el movimiento indígena”, complaining that the federation only sees “dos lados, dos opciones”.²⁴

¹⁹ Community Informant. Interview with author. Personal interview. FJ 32, 37. Shintuya, November 5, 2013.

²⁰ Community Informants...FJ 23, 29. Shintuya, November 3/5, 2013.

²¹ Community Informants...FJ 31, 33. Shintuya, November 5/6, 2013.

²² Community Informants. Interviewed by author. Community Assembly. FJ 40. Shintuya, November 10, 2013.

²³ Haselip & Romera. “Peru’s Amazonian oil and gas industry...” (16).

²⁴ Community Informants... FJ 41. Shintuya, November 10, 2013.

The community of Shintuya also presents significant internal divisions. The issue of a lack of community organization presented itself in almost every conversation and interview I had. In a community assembly I attended there were only approximately 30 attendees out of the total population of around 300. This creates a situation in which a large portion of the population is not informed about matters concerning the community. For example, one Shintuyano told me about the absence of a water and draining system, and that there are not any current efforts to put one in place.²⁵ Earlier that day in the assembly, two municipality representatives gave a presentation about a new water and draining project for the community, explaining the benefits of the project and that in order for it to succeed, the community members could not leave metals or garbage in a certain patch of land designated for the project, as to avoid water contamination. However, this community member, and approximately 270 other Shintuyanos not present at the assembly, was not there to hear this. Even if the Shintuyanos present at the assemblies have the best intentions and ideas, a certain amount of participation is necessary in order for them to succeed.

Community members recognize that an issue of organization exists, and some are very disillusioned because of it. Individuals told me that the community doesn't have motivation to better itself, that people have closed minds and don't plan for the long term, that the culture of Shintuya is dead, and that the community is going to disappear.²⁶ But there are also those who still hold loyalty and pride in the community of Shintuya. The president explained his vision for Shintuya as a developed community, but with a strong influence of the Arakmbut culture and language.²⁷ Many also referred to the community lovingly as "mi Shintuya" and were proud to

²⁵ Community Informant...FJ 29. Shintuya. November 10, 2013

²⁶ Community Informant...FJ 33, 50. November 6/13, 2013

²⁷ Community Informant...FJ 23. November 3, 2013.

talk and show me about their culture, and some even had plans and ideas to improve community cohesion.

One such idea was the organization of the community into associations or groups according to economic activity. For example, someone who worked in agriculture and tourism would be a part of both groups. This system would ideally create a space to discuss issues in a way that is focused and relevant to each member, perhaps more so than the general community assemblies. It could also reduce intra-community conflicts by informing everyone what others are up to. Farmers would communicate about what each one is producing and coordinate better selling prices. In this way, this system could aid in fostering more community unity and in defining what the community desires for its future. A large spectrum of interest in community unity exists in Shintuya, and divisions between community members are apparent. This presents more challenges to overall regional cohesion, and makes it even more difficult for FENAMAD to show a unified front in the face of Hunt Oil and the national government.

All three types of divisions (national government-FENAMAD, FENAMAD-Shintuya, and Shintuya-Shintuya) combine to fundamentally prevent productive and effective discussion of how to collaborate on and achieve the region's goals and desires. In theory, a federation with goals of indigenous rights, self-determination, and organizational strengthening and an indigenous community seeking to meet its economic and social needs should find themselves working together, while a national government prioritizing economic growth might be expected to be at odds with these two other groups. This is generally what is seen in similar case studies where greater cohesion and unity can be seen between indigenous communities and their umbrella organizations.

For example, the Federación Interprovincial de la Nacionalidad Achuar del Ecuador (FINAE) and the Organización de Pueblos Indígenas de Pastaza (OPIP) have developed strong regional cohesion with the Ashuar, Quichua, and Shiwiar peoples fighting against the hydrocarbon activities of USA company Arco in the Oriente region of the central Ecuadorian Amazon. Both organizations collaborate with constituent communities through development projects such as farming and tourism and maintain a physical presence in the communities with frequent visits and workshops. In extreme cases, sanctions are imposed on communities and/or community members if they deviate from the agreed upon strategy of no access to oil companies, cutting them off from the organization's development initiatives. OPIP also presents willingness to adapt, modifying its strategy to one of negotiations for consultation and compensation with Arco after communities showed resistance to the no access policy. The authors recognize that the organizations OPIP and FINAE do not have to deal with overwhelming divergences in regional interests, as the majority of their constituent communities have similar interests. This is not the case with FENAMAD, which has to deal with the heterogeneity of its constituent communities. This does not, however, detract from this example's usefulness in this study, as it highlights successful strategies in promoting regional cohesion and unity, such as tangible development projects, sanctioning instruments, and strong informational presence through workshops and visits to the communities.²⁸

Into the Future

In Madre de Dios, FENAMAD has been limited to the language employed in national legislation, which results in a conservationist stance that is inherently anti-oil. Shintuya, which has decided that its desirable future involves getting the most possible out of the oil concession, does not see this stance as useful and does not see a pressing need to participate in FENAMAD's

²⁸ Haller et al. *Fossil Fuels, Oil Companies, and Indigenous Peoples...* (573).

cause. The bottom line is that if the desirable future of Shintuya involves working with Hunt Oil, then the best strategy forward is to work with the community on how to get the best possible deal, not just economically but also socially, culturally, and environmentally. In order to achieve this goal, two main factors can be identified. First is the ability of the community to identify a clear, desirable future. While Shintuyanos mostly agree that taking advantage of the oil concession to the greatest degree possible is the desired course of action, a lack of community organization makes it difficult to present a unified and coherent front to the outside world. The second factor, undoubtedly interconnected with the first, is how outside actors approach situations involving extractive industries and interact with the local community.

Even if one fundamentally disagrees with the conclusion that Shintuya has come to, or legitimately believes that a community is making a choice that will compromise its own future, the benefit still lies in working with the community toward the goal(s) it has set for itself. Once stakeholders are fighting together, whether it is against extraction or for getting a better deal out of it, forward progress is much more likely to occur. What is more, the current confrontational strategies being used by indigenous organizations such as FENAMAD as well as the international conservation community are not yielding results. Imagine if the immense resources, both monetary and human, currently being spent in these head to head fights were, in areas where the communities involved identified it as desirable, reallocated to making the extraction process as sustainable as possible.

I want to be clear that I am not advocating for a clear cut, one size fits all solution. There are times when confrontation and conservationist discourse are effective and desirable allocations for resources, just as there are times when damage control for extraction is effective and desirable. What I am arguing is that who should decide this is not foreign oil companies,

national governments, international NGOs or conservationists, but the local communities themselves. Ultimately, they are the stakeholders that these decisions directly affect and that have direct interaction with the territory. Participatory conservation has done well to identify local communities as critical actors in the sustainable use of land. Instead of simply trying to use local participation to further advance one's agenda, however, local objectives should be the starting point from which the agenda is formed. Once this priority is established, outside actors can begin to reevaluate how they can use their privilege and resources to most effectively promote and achieve these communities' desirable futures. In doing so, these outside actors would actually be doing what is necessary to build the communities' capacities to the point where they have the information, tools, and strength to lead the conversation and effectively handle conflicts with extractive industries.

Conclusion

While the conflict in Madre de Dios surrounding Hunt Oil has unarguably caused problems throughout the region, it has also shed light on important regional divisions and cohesion issues, which can be broken down into three categories: 1) divisions between the indigenous umbrella organization FENAMAD and the national government, 2) divisions between individual communities and FENAMAD, and 3) divisions within the individual communities themselves. These three main stakeholders discussed in this article all have distinct visions for the future of the region, and implement different strategies in order to accomplish them. The national government, prioritizing natural resource extraction and economic growth, has implemented and altered legislation to allow oil exploration and extraction in the Amarakaeri Communal Reserve, and the only legislation legitimately protecting the ACR is based strictly on conservation grounds, only involving the local communities through participatory conservation.

FENAMAD, however, which adamantly opposes the presence of Hunt Oil, has been limited to this conservationist discourse in their approach to the issue. Their legal suit against the company denounces its presence based mainly on environmental and basic health concerns surrounding river headwaters, biodiversity, and ecological equilibrium. Thus, the federation is stuck striving for, at a maximum, adherence to conservation legislation, whose actual functionality in the communities surrounding the ACR has been seriously questioned not only by my findings in Shintuya, but also in previous studies (Alvarez, et al. 2008, 2010). This has caused Shintuyanos to distance themselves from FENAMAD, not only in their working directly with Hunt Oil but also in their attitudes towards the federation's utility, undermining regional cohesion and unity and weakening the region's potential to effectively define and pursue their goals.

These regional divisions demonstrate the failures discussed in post-developmentalism of the current development paradigm. This paradigm was created in a different time, under a different set of circumstances, and it is clearly not working in today's world, as my case study exemplifies. In order to move forward, the conversation needs to shift from one of confrontation and strictly ecological conservation to one of how to mutually collaborate toward a desirable future. In order to heal 80 years of disempowerment caused by failed development paradigms we need to heavily invest in the capacity of local communities so they have the strength to lead the development conversation. Only then will we actually have a chance at socially just, environmental, and developmental sustainability.

This research is meant to accurately frame the current situation in Madre de Dios, and explain the reasons for the existing intra stakeholder tensions surrounding Hunt Oil. It also calls for a shift in how outside actors approach development in situations of natural resource

extraction. Valuable future research should delve deeper into how these outside actors and organizations (NGOs, universities, international governments, etc.) can potentially help facilitate better communication between the stakeholders discussed in this article. What data and information could be most helpful to the native communities and/or FENAMAD? How is it best disseminated? Future research should also evaluate what strategies and/or relationships with local communities are best for achieving their desirable future. Future studies regarding how FENAMAD is approaching the implementation of RED++, as well as the indigenous marches in Lima, Peru for addressing climate change, should be considered in any future investigations on this topic, as it suggests an increasing amount of regional unity.²⁹ I also acknowledge that this article approaches post-developmentalism and the situation in Madre de Dios from a political and anthropological perspective. I believe it would be valuable for future research to complement this article with an economic approach, evaluating economic possibilities of various potential future outcomes of the region.

²⁹ FENAMAD representatives seem to be taking a pro RED++ stance, but are adamant that its conservation objectives be approached from an indigenous perspective. For more on this recent development, see: <https://www.facebook.com/FENAMAD/posts/874026495964387> and <https://www.facebook.com/FENAMAD/photos/a.207420545958322.58444.201180499915660/873614672672236/?type=1> . Marches were also held in Peru's capital on December 10, 2014, in congruence with the COP20 United Nations conference on climate change. Named the "marcha mundial en defensa de la madre tierra" it involved social leaders from Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador, as well as Central American, Asian, and European countries. For more on the marches, see: http://www.diariolasamericas.com/5051_america-latina/2836783_miles-de-personas-se-unieron-a-la-marcha-en-defensa-de-la-tierra-en-lima.html

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
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Annexes

Annex I: Lot 76 and Seismic Lines



Source: Hunt Oil. http://hidrocarburosenanp.blogspot.com/2010_10_01_archive.html

